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Abstract
Smart grids have been witnessing continuous and rapid radical developments in the
recent years. With the aim towards a more sustainable energy system, the share of dis-
tributed generation resources is ever-increasing and transforming the traditional operations
of the power grids. Along with these allocated resources, an ensemble of smart measure-
ment devices, multiple communication layers, sophisticated distributed control techniques
and interconnection of system equipment represent the pillars that support the moderniza-
tion of these power networks. This progress has undoubtedly enabled a more efficient and
accurate operation of the power networks. At the same time, it has created vulnerability
points and challenges that endanger the safety and security of the smart grids operation.
The cyber-physical security of smart grids has consequently become a priority and a ma-
jor challenge to ensure a reliable and safe operation of the power grid. The resiliency of
the grid depends on our ability to design smart grid that can withstand threats and be
able to mitigate against different attack scenarios. Cyber-physical security is currently an
active area of research, and threats that target critical operation components have been
classified and investigated in the literature. However, many of the research efforts have
focused on the threats on the transmission level, with the intention of extending the pro-
tection, detection and mitigation strategies to the distribution level. Nevertheless, many
of the performed analysis is not suitable for Power Distribution Systems (PDS) due to the
inherently different characteristics of these systems.
This thesis first investigates and addresses the stealthy False Data Injection (FDI) at-
tacks on the PDS, which target the Distribution Systems Optimal Power Flow (DSOPF)
and are not detectable by traditional Bad Data Detection (BDD) methods. The attacks
formulation is based on the Branch Current State Estimation (BCSE), which allows sepa-
ration of the phases, thus full analysis on the unbalanced three-phase system is performed.
In specific, it is shown how an adversary, having access to system measurements and
topology, is able to maximize the system losses. By launching FDI attacks that target the
Distribution Systems State Estimation (DSSE), the adversary constructs the attack vectors
that drive the objective function in the opposite direction of optimality. Optimal attack
strategy effects is investigated. The results demonstrate the increase in system losses after
corrupting the measurements.
Second, a machine learning technique is proposed as a protection measure against
the cyber-physical threats to detect the FDI attacks. Although FDI vectors cannot be
detected by conventional BDD techniques, exploiting the historical data enables a more
thorough analysis and a better detection advantage of anomalies in the measurements.
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) is applied on the stream of data measurements to
iii
identify any anomaly, which represents a compromised measurement, by analyzing multiple
points across the measurement vector and multiple time steps. The temporal correlation
of data points is the basis of identifying attack vectors. The results of the RNN model
indicate an overall strong ability to detect the stealthy attacks.
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1.1 Problem Description and Motivation
Recent advancements in power systems have rendered smart grids a more than ever sophis-
ticated complex system. System operators are currently facing, more than ever,different
challenges to maintain a reliable and safe operation of the overall power systems, which
include generation, transmission and distribution levels. Concerning Power Distribution
Systems (PDS), the main driving force for change is the large scale integration of Dis-
tributed Generation (DG) units, including renewable energy resources, with the aim of a
more sustainable and greener energy systems [3]. In the aim of achieving these aspirations,
many transformations have been recently occurring, among these are: Introduction of
communication in control and monitoring and the implementation of distributed Volt-Var
Control (VVC) strategies [4], usage of digital field meters and Phasor Measurement Units
(PMUs) [5], increasing number of microgrids [6], high share of renewable energy sources [3].
A direct consequence of these changes is the creation of new challenges and vulnerabilities
for the modern grid. One of the most critical vulnerability is the cyber-physical security
[7, 8, 9]. The cyber-physical security aspect of the smart grid has become of utmost im-
portance for power system operators as it keeps the entirety of energy systems in a safe
and secure state against a myriad of threats. The consequences of malicious attacks range
from economical effects, to partial malfunctioning of equipment and sub-systems, all the
way to cascading failures and shut-down of entire power systems [10, 11]. These attacks
can target both the cyber part, which consists of the communication and software layer,
or the physical part, which consists of the electrical power devices and equipment [12].
Although the PDS represents a major component of the modern smart grid, much of
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the research in the area of cyber-physical security is focused on transmission systems [13].
Due to the inherent fundamental differences between transmission systems and the PDS
including but not limited to system topology, unbalanced phases, number of measurement
devices, and the high number of nodes, many of the assumptions made for attacks formu-
lation and detection do not hold for PDS. Accordingly, two main operations are considered
in this work for analysis of cyber-physical security on PDS: Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
and State Estimation (SE).
The OPF lies in the heart of grid control, as operators seek to optimize various objec-
tives, such as voltage regulation, loss minimization and system configuration, constrained
by the electrical laws and grid operation limits. The nonlinear nature of the OPF problem
makes it difficult to obtain accurate results, especially for Distribution Systems Optimal
Power Flow (DSOPF), as many of the OPF approaches formulated for studies on the
transmission level are not suitable for PDS characterized with high R/X ratio and radial
topologies [14]. The same logic holds for the Distribution Systems State Estimation (DSSE)
process, where the approach differs based on the nature and topology of the system [15, 16].
For example, in radial distribution systems, the Branch Current State Estimation (BCSE)
model is found to be more suitable than node voltages [17], as its computation efficiency al-
lows better convergence based on the branch power flow model. In addition, the analysis of
the state estimation BDD is usually implemented on the DC power flow, a linear version of
the AC power flow. This simplification is acceptable for the transmission level studies, but
it does not suit PDS. For the state estimation procedure, voltage magnitudes and angles
are usually chosen as system states. Accordingly, Liu et al. started investigating stealthy
False Data Injection (FDI) attacks using the DC power flow. Authors also investigated
FDI on AC power flow models [18], but again the investigation was on the transmission
level systems. Concerning PDS, many authors became interested in analyzing different
threats against distribution networks operations. Recently, Deng et al. [19] were among
the first to investigate the FDI attacks on the PDS level. The analysis of attacks was based
on the assumption of a single phase system, with local attacks and without consideration
of VVC devices, such as line voltage regulators or shunt capacitors. This attack model is
considered as part of the physical security for three reasons: i) The literature considers
these attacks as cyber-physical threats as they often formulation, detection and mitigation
of attacks happen in the joint space of cyber-physical space [20, 21] ii) The majority of FDI
attacks corrupts the sent power measurements (information in cyber-space), but also can
take place by physically compromising a meter or sensor that sends the data [8]. iii) The
effects of the attacks is extended to the Volt-Var control equipment, (In this thesis only the
shunt capacitors are considered), and their KVAR injected values changed as a result of
the attack. Therefore the attacks affected the physical infrastructure of the system under
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study. On the other hand, a positive outcome of the grid modernization and digitization,
is the sheer availability of data, powered by the integration of information networks with
the smart grid . This data permits a better insight for monitoring and control of the grid
using data driven approaches such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) or Machine Learning (ML)
techniques [22, 23, 24]. Among the many applications of ML, securing the power grid is
certainly an ambitious goal [25]. Many authors have already utilized these approaches for
detection and mitigation of cyber-physical attacks [26, 27].
1.2 Research Objectives
The scope of this thesis is to develop accurate modelling of cyber-physical threats against
the PDS. Since most of the previous research work concerning cyber-physical security, and
especially FDI attacks, focuses on the transmission systems [28], there is still a demanding
necessity to build cyber-physical security models specifically tailored for PDS systems.
These systems require the detailed modelling of the unbalanced 3-phases, and the inclusion
of VVC devices such as Load Ratio Transformer (LRT) or shunt capacitors. The objective
is to evaluate the impacts of stealthy affects targeting a critical operation such as the
DSOPF. Also, a detection technique based on ML is proposed to defend against stealthy
attacks. The approach utilizes the available historical data in the attacks identification.
The two main objectives of this thesis can be listed as follows:
1. Optimal stealthy attacks strategy on PDS: In order to accurately assess the conse-
quences of cyber-physical threats, the first step is to construct a full model of the
PDS DSSE. For this reason, a three phases DSSE based on the BCSE approach has
been modeled. Stealthy FDI attacks have been constructed to bypass the BDD, and
incur maximal damage on the DSOPF.The damage is represented by the deviation in
the objective function, such as increase in the power losses. The attacks are analyzed
on a three-phases, radial and unbalanced distribution system.
2. Detection of FDI attacks on the power flow measurements : A data driven ML ap-
proach, using RNN is adopted to detect the anomalies in the power flow measure-
ments. The model aims to capture the temporal correlation of the data features,
as well as the state of the measurements at each time step. The RNN is trained to
detect stealthy attacks that bypass the traditional BDD.
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1.3 Thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized into five chapters as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents the background and literature review for the work in this thesis.
A general overview of modern PDS is given, including the process of DSOPF, as well
as the different techniques for DSSE. The requirements for cyber-physical security
of smart grids are listed, with focus on the threats and defense mechanisms that are
most relevant to the PDS. An overview of ML techniques is given, as defense and
mitigation measures for cyber-physical security in the power systems.
• Chapter 3 presents the case study of stealthy FDI attacks against the DSOPF. An
optimal attack strategy is first developed. The attack vectors are formulated and
injected into the power flow measurements to bypass the BDD of the DSSE, and
incorporated into the DSOPF. Results of the attacks are validate on the IEEE-34
unbalanced radial system.
• Chapter 4 proposes the usage of ML to detect the stealthy FDI attacks. The RNN
model is derived and built to capture the temporal correlations between the data
points of the measurements vector. The model is trained using real world data, and
the performance of the model is statistically evaluated.




Literature Review and Background
This chapter reviews the related work in literature and provides the necessary background
for the rest of the thesis. The first section presents the modern PDS and their main fea-
tures. The second section reviews the different DSSE algorithms and the mathematical
formulation of the State Estimation (SE) process. Also, the derivation of the BCSE as
the used method to estimate the sates of the studied system is presented. An overview
is also given over the Bad Data Detection as an approach to identify and eliminate bad
measurements. The third section presents the Optimal Power Flow formulation and tech-
niques used in PDS. The Branch Flow Model is presented as well as the convex relaxation
based on Semi Definite Programming. The fourth section presents the main challenges for
cyber-physical security in the PDS. Further, requirements for the cyber-physical security
are reviewed, as well as the main threats that endanger the integrity of these requirements.
A special focus is given for the stealthy FDI attacks and protection techniques against
them. The last section reviews the research done on ML which concerns the power systems
cyber-physical security.
2.1 Power Distribution Systems (PDS)
The traditional power systems have been witnessing radical transformation in their infras-
tructures. The modernization of the overall integrated complex system, renders it into
a smart grid. The waves of change reaches all the stages and levels of energy systems,
starting from power generation, to transmission systems, all the way down to Power Dis-
tribution Systems (PDS). Distribution systems operators have had a, complex but limited,
set of processes required to maintain a reliable and safe operation. The new era of smart
5
grid brings however more challenges and initiatives to improve the quality of power sys-
tems. Concerning the PDS, several functions and characteristics are desired to be included
and improved such as [29, 30]: Increased share of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)
to harness the power of renewable energy, Efficient Volt-Var Control (VVC) for different
configuration of distribution networks, integration of microgrids to increase reliability and
distribution flexibility, and enhancement of the PDS against cyber-physical security risks
to ensure a robust protection and security against malicious threats. Figure 2.1 shows

















Figure 2.1: Current PDS active research areas and interests
in their infrastructure from the transmission systems. These differences should be con-
sidered in the different analyses in the distribution systems operation - such as and not
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limited to DSSE - to achieve accurate results. The main distinctive features of PDS can
be summarized as follows [15]:
1. System topologies: Distribution networks have distinctively radial configurations,
which allows a cheap and simple operation. Modern distribution networks witness
rapid integration of DGs, which render the power flow bi-directional instead of the
traditional unidirectional flow.
2. Phases imbalance: Distribution loads are not necessarily symmetrical in nature,
which results in an unbalance between the three phases. The increasing share of DG
units integrated into the distribution networks have further heightened the level of
imbalance. Consequently, a single-phase equivalent representation, which assumes a
phases-balanced system, is not an appropriate approximation for DSSE, and the full
three-phases model is to be considered.
3. Number of measurement devices: The number of measurements data is defi-
cient in PDS to ensure system observability [16]. In order to overcome this problem,
pseudo-measurements are utilized. Pseudo-measurements are obtained from histori-
cal data at specific nodes, and are defined as Gaussian distributions.
4. R/X ratio: PDS cables are characterized by a high R/X ratio. This high ra-
tio prevents certain relaxations and simplifications which are routinely exercises in
Transmission level systems. An example of these simplifications is the usage of the
linear DC power flow instead of nonlinear AC power flow.
5. High number of nodes: Due to the large networks structure, PDS have a high
number of nodes. This results in a curse of dimensionality, where the computation
burden significantly increases for any calculation on these networks.
6. Network model uncertainty: In contrast with the assumption of full knowledge of
lines parameters, there is a high uncertainty in the network model, which negatively
affects any process such as the DSSE [15].
2.1.1 Volt-Var Control (VVC) in PDS
The task of Volt/Var regulation is considered of highest importance in the distribution
systems. The system operator aims to maintain the voltage level along the feeders within
the specified limits at all times. This task has become more complicated due to the in-
creased number of DGs, which significantly change the voltage profile [31, 32]. This section
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provides a survey of various VVC schemes in Active Distribution Networks (ADNs). The
control schemes are classified based on the used communication structure, as it will help
categorize the cyber security risks in later sections. These schemes do not require remote
measurements and they only depend on measurements at Points of Common Coupling
(PCC). Due to their autonomous control structure, these methods require limited coor-
dination and are generally more robust against communication-caused problems [33, 34].
However, they do not achieve optimal performance because of the limitations of communi-
cation with different systems components [35]. The communication based schemes can be
categorized into: i) Centralized, ii) Distributed and iii) Decentralized. This classification
will help in the assessment and classification of cyber-physical threats and attacks that
target VVC schemes.
• Centralized Control: In centralized VVC schemes, one central controller is respon-
sible for computing a global solution and sends control commands to all Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs). The centralized control scheme is more efficient the local
scheme and requires smaller safety margins to remote measurements. In the same
time, it is dependable on more communication links and does not adapt to changing
operation needs [36]. Multiple authors have addressed the problem of DGs integra-
tion in distribution network based on centralized control scheme. In[37], coordinated
voltage control algorithms are proposed to mitigate voltage rise problems and opti-
mize usage of distributed energy resources. An efficient dispatch of load tap changers
and shunt capacitors is proposed in [38].
• Decentralized Control: The decentralized control scheme aims to partition the
power network into multiple sub-networks (zones), which communicate with each
other [39, 40] to achieve VVC in the network. This allows running the voltage
regulation problem in each sub-network area, rendering the optimization problem
easier to tackle. In [41], the authors achieved voltage regulation through a distributed
algorithm based on the ε decomposition of the sensitivity matrix. The control action
is coordinated by communication between the areas to achieve optimal generation of
the DGs.
• Distributed Control: The distributed control scheme establishes communication
between each IEDs and neighboring nodes. The distributed control, along with the
decentralized control, schemes are largely viewed as better approaches in the modern
ADNs [42, 43]. The distributed control schemes allows a more efficient integration of
distributed energy resources. However these benefits comes with the cost of adding
vulnerable points to distribution networks.
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2.2 Distribution Systems State Estimation (DSSE)
As a main part of the DMS, Distribution systems operators utilize the SE process in order
to acquire knowledge of the system state variables such as voltage nodes or branch currents.
Figure 2.2 shows the SE process as a perquisite for all major processes such as DSOPF.




















Figure 2.2: DSSE process in the DMS
The process of SE is critical to a reliable operation of the power systems as it ensures
accurate representation of the system states given the uncertainty and errors of received
measurements from various field devices. The majority of the implemented techniques
for SE, however, are geared towards transmission systems and do not always suit the
distribution systems[44], [17]. In the realm of PDS, this process is commonly referred to as
DSSE, and different algorithms are implemented for this process. This section presents the
mathematical formulation of the Weight Least Squares (WLS) algorithm, as it is the most
common algorithm for DSSE. Based on the WLS method, the BCSE model is derived as
the chosen model to implement the DSSE in this thesis. The Performance of the BCSE
is evaluated on the IEEE-34 unbalanced radial bus system. As a direct result of the
distinctive features of PDS, presented in the previous section, many dedicated research work
9
have developed specific techniques of SE, commonly referred to as Distribution Systems
State Estimation (DSSE) tailored to fit the specific needs of distribution networks. The
first class of DSSE algorithms are based on the WLS. System states can be voltage nodes
[45, 46], or branch currents [47, 48]. Another approach is based on load adjustments, where
the modeling of the loads is dependent on the customers profile curves [49]. Authors in
[50, 51] adopted the iterative Gauss-Seidel load flow algorithm to adjust bus loads. Another
category of DSSE focuses on the robustness of the process against any bad data or corrupted
measurements. Machine Learning techniques have been employed in [52] to adjust weights
based on confidence in their validity. Authors in [53] utilized the concept of leverage
measurements to reduce measurements with high residuals. The modern PDS can be
divided into zones and sub-networks, and distributed monitoring and control techniques are
applied to all the sub-networks. The distributive process reduces the stress on a centralized
control center to handle huge amounts of data with accuracy and speed. To that end,
algorithms of distributed DSSE have been proposed for multi-area State Estimation [54, 55].
These processes can be done in parallel or in sequence [55]. Another well-known class of
DSSE is Dynamic based State Estimation. In this types of DSSE, recursive estimations
are based on consecutive snapshots measurements. The most common technique utilized
for this approach is the iterated Kalman Filter method [56, 57]. Figure 2.3 summarizes the






























Figure 2.3: DSSE algorithms
10
2.2.1 Mathematical Formulation
This section reviews the general mathematical derivation of the SE process in details, and
presents the WLS algorithm. Distribution systems operators collect field measurements
and process them in order to infer the system states. The measurements vector consist of
line active and reactive power flow measurements, bus active and reactive power injections,
bus voltages magnitudes and angles. The measurement function h(x) maps the system









h1(x1, x2, · · · , xn)
h2(x1, x2, · · · , xn)
...







 = h(x) + e (2.1)
where
z : power flow measurements vector ∈ Rm
x : system states variables vector ∈ Rn
h(x) : nonlinear measurement function that maps the states to the measurements
e : measurements error vector ∈ Rm
The errors in this model represent the limited accuracy of readings, a malfunctioning
meter or uncertainty of pseudo-measurement. Measurements errors are modeled as white
Gaussian noise with zero mean and standard deviation σ. Typical choice of states x are
voltage nodes magnitudes and angles, and branch currents. The measurement function
h(x) depends on the network model used. In this work, the three phases PI model is
considered [59]. The model of the lines between the sending node Vs and receiving node Vr
is shown in Figure 2.4: For a phase subscript φ ∈ {a, b, c}, Isφ is the current from sending
end, Iφ is the branch current, Irφ is the current at the receiving node end, and Iyφ is the
current flowing through the ground.
2.2.2 Weight Least Squares
The WLS method is the most common used method for state estimation, due to its high
robustness and low computation cost. The standard approach of the WLS aims to minimize
the weighted squares of the difference between the estimated measurements and the actual
measurements [59]. The difference is referred to as the residual r and is represented as:





























Figure 2.4: Three phases PI model








= [z − h(x)]ᵀW−1 [z − h(x)] (2.3)
where σ2i is the variance of meter (measurement) i, and W is a weighting diagonal matrix
whose elements are the variance of meters errors, i.e., W = diag{σ21, σ22, · · · , σ2m}. The




= −Hᵀ(x)W−1[z − h(x)] (2.4)






A Taylor expansion is applied to Equation 2.4 around the variable xk:
g(x) = g(xk) +G(xk)(x− xk) + · · · = 0 (2.6)





The Gain matrix is usually sparse, positive definite and symmetric. Applying an iterative
method such as the Gauss-Newton minimization method results in:
xk+1 = xk −
[
G(xk)
]−1 · g(xk) (2.8)
where k is the iteration index, xk is the solution vector at iteration k. The solution is
found by iteratively solving Equation (2.8) until a satisfactory accuracy is reached, usually
implemented by pre-setting a threshold for accuracy or a maximum number of iterations.
2.2.3 Branch Current State Estimation
The BCSE model is used for DSSE, as it is more accurate and is more efficient for the
state estimation iterative procedure in radial systems [60]. In addition, the usage of BCSE
allows the decoupling of the phases in the unbalanced systems.








im, are the real and imaginary components of the branch currents, respectively,
Branch currents are determined from the real and reactive power flow measurements for









where Pm,φ, Qm,φ are the real and reactive power measurements, respectively, with the
superscript m denoting a measurement quantity, and V φs is the node voltage. The mea-





























im) is the branch current magnitude measurement function. The

















where ms, and mc denote the number of power measurements and branch current mag-
nitude measurements, respectively. The first summation reflects the optimization of the
power measurements, and the second summation of the current measurements. The first











where A is a constant matrix with the entries equal -1 or 1. To validate the accuracy of
the BCSE, a model is built to estimate the voltage magnitudes and angles of the IEEE-34
radial system. The results are compared to the voltage profile reported in [61]. Figure
2.5 depicts the absolute percentage error in the voltage magnitudes of the three phases
for each node. The maximum error does not pass the 0.9% mark. Figures 2.6 and 2.7
show the comparison between the voltage magnitudes (in p.u.) and the voltage angles (in
degrees), respectively. The results confirm the accuracy of the BCSE for estimating the
node voltages for all the nodes.
2.2.4 Bad Data Detection
The process of SE may include bad measurements that results in unreliable predictions
of the system state. Several reasons contribute to bad measurements such as meter mal-
functioning, or intentional malicious attacks. Several, statistical based, techniques have
been developed to identify and eliminate bad measurements [62, 63]. The core defense
mechanism is based on the Bad Data Detection (BDD) approach, which is a statistical
approach that compares the residual difference between the measurements vector and the
estimated measurements vector resulting from the SE process. A common approach based
on the residuals in the Largest Normalized Residual Test (LNRT) [59]. This test is used
14










































Figure 2.5: BCSE magnitudes errors
to detect and remove bad measurements, as follows: i) Compute the residual according to
(2.2), ii) find the largest residual and compare it to a pre-defined threshold, and remove
this measurement if the residual exceeds the threshold, iii) re-iterate the SE process again.
2.3 Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
The OPF processes in power systems encompasses optimization problems that aims to
optimize certain operation objectives using numerical analysis. The OPF has been intro-
duced by Carpentier which was formulated as an extension to economic load dispatch to
minimize the total cost of electricity generation while keeping the electrical system within
the prescribed operation limits [64]. Over the period of more than five decades, OPF has
been a research focus and has become a mature operation utilized by system operators.
The OPF can be constructed in different variants based on the objective of the system
operator, and the nature of the modeled power system. For example, Security constrained
OPF includes the power system contingency constraints [65, 66]. A commonly used version
15

















































































Figure 2.6: Voltage magnitudes comparison
of the OPF is the DCOPF, which is a Linear Programming optimization problem [67, 68].
The application of the OPF determines the objective function as it can be applied to
minimize operation costs, optimize capacitor placement, or optimizes nodal pricing of
power. Equality constraints of the optimization problem include the power balances of the
system at each node, while the inequality constraints include the control variable limits,
voltage magnitude limits, thermal limits, bound on voltage angles, and operating limits on
power flows.
A subset of OPF formulations has been tailored to better suit the nature of the PDS,
and is known as Distribution Systems Optimal Power Flow (DSOPF) [69, 70, 71]. Optimal
Reactive Power Flow (ORPF), also referred to as reactive power dispatch or VAR control
aims to minimize the losses in distribution networks. In ORPF, the real power generation
is calculated beforehand [72]. In addition to the classical OPF formulation, the vector
of control variables includes the effects of phase-shifting and load tap change transform-
ers, shunt capacitors operations, which are often represented by integer variables for tap
changes, and binary variables for ON/OFF switching of shunt capacitors [73].
The DSOPF is inherently a non-convex problem, because of the non-convex and non-
16






























































































Figure 2.7: Angles comparison
linear constraints, which makes reaching an accurate optimal solution a non-trivial task.
In order to overcome the nonlinear and non-convex constraints, there are usually three
approaches [74]: i) linearize power flow constraints, ii) look for local optima, or iii) convex
relaxations of the power flow constraints. Since convex problems guarantee finding global
minimum, convex DSOPF (or OPF in general) determines absolute lower or upper bound
of control effort. In addition, as PDS, are usually radial in nature, it is more efficient to
utilize Branch Flow Model for the power flows. In [75], authors utilize a Semi Definite
Programming (SDP) convex relaxation for OPF in radial distribution networks and prove
the exactness of the approach.
2.3.1 OPF Formulation
The OPF is an optimization problem that seeks to optimize a particular objective func-
tion in the power systems operations. System operators depend on the OPF to minimize
operations costs, limit voltage deviations, ensure system supply security, and optimally






subject to g(x) = 0, (2.16b)
h(x) ≤ 0 (2.16c)
where
f(x) is the objective function
g(x) is the set of equality constraints
h(x) is the set of inequality constraints
The objective function expresses the quantity to be optimized, the equality and constraints
represent the physical laws such as power balance and kirchoff’s laws, and the inequality
constraints define bounds of operations and contingency constraints on voltages and power
flows. The two sets of constraints have to be obeyed while solving the OPF problem.
2.3.2 Branch Flow Model (BFM)
The Branch Flow Model (BFM) is considered in this thesis to model the DSOPF, as it
is most suitable for the PDS, which are usually radial in nature [76]. For a radial system
with a set of N buses indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n, and E distribution lines connecting these
buses, the power flow equations can be formulated as follows [73]:
sj = (Sij − zij|Iij|2)−
∑
(j,k)∈E
Sjk, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (2.17)
Vi − Vj = zijIij, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (2.18)
Sij = ViI
∗
ij, ∀(i, j) ∈ E (2.19)
where
sj = pj + pj : complex net load on bus j (net load is defined as the consumption minus generation),
Sij = Pij + jQij : complex power flow from bus i to bus j,
zij = rij + jxij : impedance on line (i, j),
Iij : complex current from bus i to bus j,
Vi : complex voltage on bus i
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Equation (2.17) defines the power balance at each bus j, Equation (2.18) is Ohm’s law
on each line (i, j), and Equation (2.19) defines the complex power on each line (i, j). The
following variables are introduced for notational simplicity: vi = V
2
i and lij = I
2
ij. From
Equations (2.17) and (2.18), we get:




and by taking the square of the magnitude:
vj = vi + |zij|2lij − (zijS∗ij + z∗ijSij) (2.21)
Separating Equations (2.17) and (2.19) into active and reactive power terms yields:















The set of Equations (2.22)-(2.25) were first introduced in [73] to model radial systems,
and they represent a relaxed branch flow model of Equations (2.17)-(2.19). The former
set of Equations represent in the variables (P,Q, l, v) represent a subset of the original
modelling variables (S, I, V ), without the current and voltage phasor angles. According to
[77], there is a one-to-one correspondence between Equations (2.17)-(2.19) and Equations
(2.22)-(2.25) in radial networks, and it is therefore possible to compute, effectively, the
phasors angles based on the latter set of Equations. To construct the OPF problem, we
add the following constraints to the branch flow model (Equations (2.22)-(2.25)):
pi ≤ (pi) ≤ p̄i i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.26)
qi ≤ (qi) ≤ q̄i i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.27)
which represent the lower and upper bounds on active and reactive power, and
vi ≤ (vi) ≤ v̄i i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.28)
which represents the lower and upper bounds of bus voltage magnitudes.
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2.3.3 Semi Definite Programming Optimal Power Flow
The OPF is an integral part of the distribution systems operations, and is used to effi-
ciently optimize the operation of the distribution network. For the PDS, the complexity of
DSOPF arises from the 3-phases, unbalanced radial configuration of the networks. Several
approaches are used to obtain the most accurate representation and reduce the required
computation. Approaches usually attempt to either linearize the constraints, find local
optima, or relax the constraints into convex constraints [78]. The convex relaxation ap-
proach consists of transforming a non-convex problem into a convex-problem, so one global





Figure 2.8: Convex relaxation of a non-convex function
Concerning the DSOPF, there is growing interest in convex relaxations on OPF [79,
78]. Many of the research assumes a single-phase model, based on the assumption that
multi-phases networks can be rendered into equivalent single-phase network [80]. one
approach of convex relaxation is the transformation of the DSOPF into a convex Semi
Definite Programming (SDP) problem. Authors in [75] proposed an SDP convex relaxation
and a linear approximation of power flow, and proved that the former is exact iff the
latter is exact as well. This work has been applied to multi-phase radial networks, and is
applicable for VVC and demand response. The three main concerns in regard to the OPF
convex relaxations in general [75]: i) Feasibility of global optimal solution through convex
relaxations, ii) Efficient convex relaxation computations, and iii) Numerical stability. In
this work, the convex relaxations based on SDP is chosen for its numerical stability [81].
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A SDP optimization problem has the standard form:
minimize C •X (2.29a)
subject to Ai •X = bi, ∀i = 1, · · · ,m, (2.29b)
X  0, (2.29c)
where X ∈ Sn+, and Sn+ denotes the set of positive semidefinite symmetric n× n matrices,
and C is also symmetric. Constraint (2.29c) denotes X is a positive semidefinite symmetric
matrix. The objective function is a linear function of the matrix X, and there are m linear
equality constraints, denoted by constraint (2.29b). With the SDP formulation, a wide
variety of optimization problems can be solved efficiently, in theory and in practice [82].















i − (SijzHij + SHij zij) + zijlijzHij ), (2.30c)













where Ci(si) denotes the power losses at bus i, and si is the branch power injection. The
reactive power of the shunt capacitors is represented by relaxing their output as continuous
variables and constraining the real part of si to zero, Vi denotes the voltage at node i, while
Iij denotes the branch current between nodes i and j. Control variables are defined by:
vi = ViV
H , lij = IijI
H




ij , with the superscript H indicating the Hermitian
transpose, and superscript Φ as phase index. Constraint (2.30b) describes the power flow
balance equation, Kirchoff’s voltage law is described by (2.30c), lower and Upper voltage
bounds are enforced by (2.30d), while the source voltage node is enforced by (2.30e), and
(2.30f) is the positive semi-definite constraint.
2.3.4 Load Models
Power consumption for loads is dependent on voltage and frequency and therefore it is
crucial to capture an accurate behaviour of the load for the critical operations in power
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systems such as the power flow analysis and state monitoring. Considering the static loads
model, (i.e., time independent), loads characteristics can be defined as [83]:
P = p(V, f) (2.31)
Q = q(V, f) (2.32)
where P and Q are the active and reactive power, V is the voltage magnitude, and f is the
frequency. Most commonly used is the exponential load model, where loads are classified
as constant power, constant current, and constant power loads. In constant power model,
loads power do not vary with the change in voltage magnitude, and consequently the volt-
age and the current are allowed to change to hold the power constant. This load is the
most common model in transmission systems. In constant current models, the power varies
directly with the voltage magnitude. Distribution systems voltage drop calculations typi-
cally model loads as current sinks. In constant impedance model, the power varies with the
square of voltage magnitude. This model is utilized for certain voltage unbalance analysis














where P0 and Q0 define the active and reactive power consumption at the rated voltage
V0. For Constant impedance loads α = β = 2, for constant current loads α = β = 1, and
for constant power loads α = β = 0. The sensitivity of load power to voltage is derived by











This sensitivity analysis is widely used for voltage stability calculations. By arrangement




Thus, the normalized sensitivity of power is equal to the corresponding load exponent [83].








Equation (2.37) implicates that the change in voltage based on power variation will be
most sensitive for lower α values. Therefore, voltage values of constant power loads will
be of higher sensitivity, then constant current, and finally constant impedance.
2.4 Cyber-Physical Security
The cyber-physical security of the power systems is considered one of the most critical
challenges to the overall modern grid. The Power Distribution Systems (PDS) are wit-
nessing an increasing penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) that add new
layers of challenges to goal of operating the power networks securely and reliably. With
the incorporation of communication into the power networks, a wide range of vulnerability
points are created [20]. The motivations behind launching cyber-physical attacks include,
but not limited to, financial motives (e.g., energy theft), terrorism and system corruption
(e.g., cascading failures of energy systems) [84]. The cyber-physical security aspect affects
nearly all the critical operations of monitoring, control and protection for the power sys-
tems. Thus, it is of the utmost importance to consider the various threats while designing
the modern smart grid. As an integral part of the smart grid, The PDS has its share
of risks, especially with the recent developments on the distribution level. The new up-
grades to the PDS include large shares of DGs which contribute to a bi-directional power
flow, new schemes of VVC which are based on communication and coordination between
different control equipment, and the addition of smart meters and measurement devices
that send sensitive data over multiple communication networks. Table 2.1 summarizes the
classification of the cyber-physical challenges that face the modern PDS.
Table 2.1: Risks due to modernization of distribution networks
Conventional Power Distribution Systems Modern Power Distribution Systems
Possible cyber-physical
security threats
Unidirectional flow Bidirectional power flow [85, 86]
Local and simple
centralized Volt-Var Control
Sophisticated strategies [87, 88]
Non-existing
distributed generation
Large share of Distributed Generators (DGs)







Local measurements units Smart sensors, digital meters and PMUs [92, 11, 93]
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2.4.1 Cyber-Physical Security Requirements
There are different technical and also regulatory challenges for the security in the recent dis-
tribution system [94, 95] include: 1) the complexity and scale of future power distribution
systems, 2) traditional communication vulnerabilities, 3) new communication requirements
4) trustworthy between all participation parties, 5) legacy devices, 6) heterogeneous tech-
nologies and protocols, 7) proprietary systems, and 8) users privacy. To overcome all the
pre-mentioned challenges, many security properties are required by the power distribution
systems i.e., availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, authorization. These
requirements can be defined as:
1. Availability: Requires that the data must be available to the authorized parties
when there is a need for this data without any security compromise [96, 97, 98, 99].
It assures that all network resources (e.g., data, bandwidth, equipment, servers) are
always available at all nodes for the authorized parties [100, 7, 101]. The importance
of the availability of data has been from the fact that the cyber layer of the distri-
bution system, and in power system in general, manages the continuous power flow
in the physical layer. Therefore, any data shortage may drive the the power system
operators to make wrong decisions.
2. Confidentiality: Means that data is disclosed only to authorized individuals or sys-
tems [100, 7, 96, 97, 98, 99]. Critical data in power system distribution e.g., meter
data should be confidential. Meter data is critical because it provides information
about the usage patterns for individual appliances, which can reveal personal activ-
ities through non-intrusive appliance monitoring. For this purpose, the meter data
should be protected such that only intended parties can access. Price information
and control commands are not critical as long as it is public knowledge [20].
3. Integrity: Is the assurance that the accuracy and consistency of data is maintained.
No unauthorized modifications, destruction or losses of data go without being de-
tected [100, 7, 101, 96, 97, 98, 99]. Integrity of price information, meter data, control
commands, and software used in power system substations are critical. For instance,
negative prices injected by an attacker can cause an electricity utilization spike as
numerous devices would simultaneously turn on to take advantage of the low price.
The impact of attacking the integrity of meter data and control commands is mostly
limited to revenue loss. However, integrity of software is critical since compromised
software or malware can control any device and component in the power system [20].
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4. Authorization: Also known as access control as it makes sure that the access
rights of every entity in the substation are defined for the purposes of access control
[100]. On one hand, authorization distinguishes between valid and invalid users for
all other security objectives, e.g., confidentiality, integrity, etc. On the other hand of
access control, it restricts the ability to issue commands to the plant control system.
Violation of authorization may cause safety issues [12].
5. Authentication: Identity verification of a communication system practitioner and
linking this identity to a system-internal principal (e.g., valid user account) by which
this user is known to the system. In other words, the validation that communicating
parties are who they claim they are, and that messages supposedly sent by them are
indeed sent by them [100]. Most other security objectives, most notably authoriza-
tion, distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate users based on authentication
[12]
2.4.2 Threats Analysis
Common cyber-physical attack models
In order to equip the PDS, and the whole of smart grids for that matter, against cyber-
physical threats, a thorough analysis of the network architecture and the different inter-
connection links is of utmost necessity. The most commonly threats and attack models in
literature include:
• Man in the middle attacks: By getting access to a communication channel,
an adversary alters metering devices and thus compromising the availability and
integrity of power system data. Conditions and impacts of such attacks is presented
in [102], and data framing attack is proposed in [103]. The replay attack is another
form of man in the middle attack that can incur catastrophic negative impacts [104].
• Rogue Devices: If an attacker gets physical access to field devices such as sensors
or PMUs, they can replace the device with a rogue one that sends corrupted signals,
or falsely acknowledges the performance of specific operation [105, 5].
• Denial of Service (DoS): DoS attacks target the availability security objective, by
attempting to corrupt, delay or block critical communication links by flooding the
communication with a bogus traffic [8]. Different communication layers in the power
systems are found to be susceptible to DoS attacks [7]: (i) Channel Jamming can
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occur on the Physical layer, with effects ranging from delayed delivery of messages
to complete denial of service [106], (ii) MAC layer, as attackers can modify MAC
parameters, leading to a spoofing attack. An Intrusion detection method is proposed
in [107] to detect threats on an IEC61850 automated substation. (iii) Network and
transport layers targeted attacks can severely affect performance of end to end com-
munication. For example, [108] investigated the vulnerability of real hardware and
software to DoS attacks.
• False Data Injection (FDI): The FDI attacks result from injecting (corrupting)
measurements data, with the goal of initiating wrong control actions. A well known
FDI model are attacks that target the SE process and bypasses the BDD, first intro-
duced by Liu et al. [109]. Several assumptions, conditions and scenarios have been
studied to launch successful attacks such as the usage of AC power flow model [18],
attacks on PDS [19], attacks with incomplete information [110], attacks against Au-
tomatic Generation Control Systems [111], and attacks targeting electricity markets
[112]. Counter-measures techniques of attacks detection and mitigation have been
investigated in [113, 114, 115]. Further analysis of the FDI attacks is presented in
chapter 3.
It is important to assess the possible threats and their impacts on the cyber-physical
requirements when designing modern power systems. Table 2.2 categories the different
attack models that threaten the distribution networks [9], [5], and the impacts on the
cyber-physical security requirements stated in the previous section.
Table 2.2: Classification of cyber-physical attacks
Attack model Cyber Physical Attack target
Denial of Service (DoS) X X Availability
Eavesdropping X Confidentiality
False Data Injection (FDI) X X Integrity
Malicious software patching X X Authentication
Man in the middle X X Integrity, Confidentiality
Rogue devices X Integrity, Confidentiality
Unauthorized access X Authorization, Confidentiality
Wireless scrambling X Integrity
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2.4.3 Cyber-physical attacks on PDS
The problem of Volt-Var optimization under malicious attacks has been investigated by
Majumdar et al. in [116]. The authors have investigated mitigation techniques against
the attacks on VVC that target the DSSE, and presented two formulations for mitigation.
The first solution depends on the local controller set-point, where it proposes the usage
of DERs power generation instead of attacked measurements. The second solution is to
use the historical data to build a density function of the attacked state. Isozaki et al. [87]
investigated the impact of cyber attacks on voltage regulation in distribution systems, in
the presence of Photovoltaic (PV) systems and the usage of communication based sensors.
The authors demonstrate that voltage regulations can occur if measurements are falsified,
and a detection algorithm is presented to limit the damage of attacks, especially in the case
of limited number of attacked sensors. The attacker falsifies measurement data to cause
irregular tap changes in the LRTs, thus causing voltage violation at feeder nodes. Two
possible attack scenarios are considered: Suppressing tap changes at the LRT, or Inducing
tap changes at the LRT. Both scenarios may lead to under-voltage (over-voltage) at some
nodes, based on the load profile at each node. In order to achieve the most efficient attack,
the attacker aim is to maximize the voltage variation, constrained by lower and upper limits
of voltage values. The proposed algorithm is composed of four steps [87]: (1) Checking
whether a measurement value Vi falls within admissible range of upper and lower limit
values for voltage at node i. (2) Checking of nodes voltage order. In the case of no power
injections through PVs, then node voltages values are smaller than those upstream. This
step is ignored in the presence of operating PVs. (3) Checking voltage Variation rate. If a
tap change did not occur in the previous time step (k − 1), then the difference, at node i,
between Vi(k) and Vi(k− 1) is lower than a time-varying upper bound. (4) Checking lower
bound on voltage differences, which is achieved by checking that the difference between
maximum and minimum voltage values at a given node is bigger than a time- varying lower
bound. The results in [87] show that falsification of measurements can be detected in the
case of limited number of attacked nodes, while voltage violation can result due to larger
number of attacks. Also, attacks that target PV output power have been investigated.
Teixeira et al. [88] addressed stealthy attacks that target integrated VVC measurements.
Considering CF, a subset of capacitor bank configuration C that satisfy all operational
constraints in system state x, the optimal configuration for cost is minimization is found
as:
C(x) = arg min
C∈CF(x)
V (x, C) (2.38)
The attacker objective is to maximize adverse impact without being detected. Therefore,
under the assumption of access only to voltage measurements, a Ck stealth attacks can be
27





Where Hv and HS are matrices derived from system topology. Moreover, the authors
present a game-theoretic framework to limit the adversary action space. The opera-
tor strategically bases countermeasures to detect and mitigate possible action strategies
adopted by the adversary. Results reveal damages that occur from data manipulation while
the operator continues to apply normal system configuration. Evaluating VVC on IEEE-13
node feeder, using GridLab-D [117]. For a stealthy attack of adding and subtracting 50
volts at two distinct nodes, respectively, the VVC was able to bring the voltages from 2450
volts to 2350 volts, although the actual desired level is 2300 volts. Deng et al. incorpo-
rated FDI attacks that bypass BDD in DSSE for PDS [19]. Although multiple FDI attacks
schemes have been proposed and analyzed in several occasions [18, 118, 119], however the
FDI was based on an attack model that assumes a strong condition of having access to
the states in the system. This strong condition may be valid and practical in transmission
systems, however it is not the case in Distribution systems due to difference in topologies
and properties of the two systems. Nodal voltage phasors values, used as system states,
cannot be easily obtained in the Distribution systems due to the limiting availability of
PMUs. To tackle this challenge, the authors propose constructing local FDI attacks, based
on approximate states obtained from local measurements. Using the voltage and phase
angles as system states, approximation of voltage magnitude and phase angle at node j,
Vj and θj are given by [19]:{
Vj ≈ Vi − (Pijrij +Qijxij) ∀j ∈ N
θj ≈ Pijxij −Qijrij ∀{i, j} ∈ L
(2.40)
where Pij, Qij and rij, xij are the active and reactive power flow, line resistance and reac-
tance between nodes i and j, respectively, while N,L are the set of nodes and set of lines
respectively. Based on these approximations, approximations of nodal voltages and phase
angles are obtained from local meter measurements. The information are used to launch a
local FDI attack. It is worth mentioning that the authors did not consider VVC in their
model. Also, the strong condition stated by the authors is valid for using nodal voltage
based SE. Table 2.3 summarizes some of the work done concerning attacks that target
VVC in PDS, and comments on the assumptions made in each work and the considered
model.
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Table 2.3: Summary of Volt/Var attacks on PDS
Attack type Contribution Approach/Solution Remarks
Falsifying voltage measurements
with PV injection nodes [87]
Mitigation
algorithm
Sequential check of nodal voltage
according to pre-set criteria
Does not consider BDD in SE
Data Integrity attacks [88]
Attack
algorithm
Stealthy attacks by corruption
set of measurements





Local FDI attacks based on
low cost approximate states
Nodal voltage based DSSE on balanced





Identification and separation of leverage
measurements using Diagnostic Robust
Generalized Potentials (DRGP)
Statistical method applied on
transmission and distribution systems




strategy and Forecast aided approaches
Backup solution based on local
measurements
2.4.4 Detection of FDI Attacks
The literature classifies methods of protection against FDI attacks into protection-based
approaches and detection-based approaches. Protection-based approaches depend on pro-
tecting measurements of certain sensors from being attacked [121]. The realization of these
approaches depends on the determination of minimal set of measurements needed for pro-
tection. Drawbacks of these approaches include the drop of measurements redundancy
and the unguaranteed effectiveness under all operating conditions [122]. Detection-based
approaches, however, use Bayesian framework to detect the attack [123]. The objective of
these methods is to detect any anomaly, or abnormal data points in the system state or
measurements. One general drawback of these methods is the inability of detecting anoma-
lies that fit the historical distribution of the data [122]. Much attention has been drawn
to the problem of detecting FDI attacks, especially when attackers are able to construct
undetectable attacks that bypass the BDD within the power system state estimators [124].
Several previous works have pointed to the consequences and implications of FDI on the
grid [125] . The authors in [126] reviewed the theoretical basis of FDI attacks and their
defense strategies in modern systems. In [127], graphical methods are used to detect at-
tacks by using tree-pruning based approximation algorithm. The authors in [122] proposed
a statistical method based on tracking the dynamics of measurements and using proba-
bility distributions derived from measurements variation to detect the attacks. Another
approach for anomaly detection is based on complementing bad data detection methods
with independent data such as historical and forecast data to detect data anomalies [128].
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2.5 Machine learning for Cyber-Physical Security
Driven by the huge amount of currently available data in many fields, the applicability
of Machine Learning (ML) techniques has been rising in popularity. ML techniques have
been used to model complex systems with high accuracy in different fields, including power
systems, with a wide range of applications. The ability to extract features from raw data
is an extremely valuable asset and alternative to tackle previously extremely demanding
computation problems. Many recent advancements in power systems researchers have
been attributed to the usage of AI and ML techniques. Deep neural networks have been
used in energy dis-aggregation to estimate each appliance consumption from the overall
home’s electrical consumption [129]. Also, adaptive neural networks has been used to de-
tect FDI attacks on the sensors of an unmanned aerial vehicles [130]. In [131], Support
Vector Machines (SVM) have been implemented to detect stealthy attacks in the smart
grid. Authors in [132] utilized ML in order to detect deception assaults in communications
networks. The approach employs SVM to learn the decision boundaries that separates
compromised from non-compromised data points. In [133], authors complemented an in-
terval SE based defense mechanism with deep learning to improve load forecasting. The
distinctive addition in [133] is the independence of the ML model on the system topol-
ogy and attack type. Stealthy FDI attacks, which cannot be detected using conventional
BDD methods, were detected using two ML approaches in [134]. Historical data were pro-
jected to low-dimensional space to prove the feasibility of attacks data separation. Both
supervised and unsupervised methods were applied to detect the stealthy attacks. Wang
et al. employed a Margin Setting Algorithm (MSA) to mitigate FDI attacks [135]. The
experimental results were compared to other ML techniques such as SVM and Artificial
Neural Networks (ANN). In order to identify any hacked meters in the smart grid, the
authors in [136] proposed an AI technique that protects the power systems against FDI at-
tacks. The AI technique detected the attacks vectors on the condition that the cumulative
injection error surpassed a pre-specified threshold. Wilson et al. proposed a stacked auto-
encoder framework against SCADA attacks [137]. The approach enhanced automation of
unsupervised machine learning models, which reduces human intervention in defining the
models.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented an overview of the PDS and the main features that characterize
radial systems. The critical operations such as DSSE and DSOPF were introduced to
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build the model in the subsequent chapters. Unlike the conventionally used approaches
to analyze different attacks scenarios, the BCSE based DSSE and the SDP based DSOPF
model accurately the radial distribution systems, and includes the unbalanced 3-phases
of the system. A general overview was of the cyber-physical threats was also presented,
with a specific focus on the FDI attacks. Finally, different ML approaches were reviewed




False Data Injection On Optimal
Power Flow
The critical problem of cyber-physical security presents itself in many forms for the Power
Distribution Systems. In this chapter a special focus is given to the stealthy False Data
Injection attacks, which cannot be detected by traditional Bad Data Detection techniques.
The attack vectors are injected to corrupt the measurements, which leads to deceiving
states perceived by the system operators. Optimal attacks strategy is formulated based on
incorporating the attack vectors into the Distribution Systems Optimal Power Flow. The
effects of the attacks are assessed based on the increase in the objective function, voltage
profile deviation, and the changes in the shunt capacitors reactive power injection.
3.1 False Data Injection (FDI)
The FDI attacks are among the well known cyber-physical threats against smart grids. Liu
et al. [109] showed that attackers, equipped with a prior knowledge of the network topology,
are able to manipulate the measurements by inserting attack vectors that are undetected by
the residue test of the state estimation techniques. Let z ∈ Rm be the original measurement
vector than can pass the bad measurement detection, where m is the total number of
measurements. For an attack vector a ∈ Rm, the compromised measurement data is
presented as:
za = z + a (3.1)
If a is constructed as a linear combination of the column vectors of H (i.e., a = Hc),
then za can pass the bad data detection. The obtained state variables estimated from
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compromised data za are referred to as x̂comp, and can be represented as x̂comp = x̂+ c,
where c is a non-zero vector ∈ Rn. Since original measurements z can pass the bad data
detection, then
‖za −Hx̂comp‖ = ‖z + a−H(x̂+ c)‖
= ‖z −Hx̂+ (a−Hc)‖
= ‖z −Hx̂‖ ≤ τ (3.2)
Thus, the L2-norm of za, which is less than threshold τ can bypass the BDD. The results
from [109] have triggered an important alarm to the necessity of revisiting the techniques
used to defend against possible cyber-physical attacks in the power networks, as conven-
tional SE approaches might fail to detect stealthy FDI that are constructed with prior
knowledge of the network topology. The work presented in [109] was based on the DC
power flow model, which is a lineraized version of the AC power flow. However the FDI
attack strategy is valid for the nonlinear AC version and is given by[18]:
a = h(x̂+ c)− h(x̂) (3.3)
where a is the structured attack vector to be added to the measurements. The attacker is
able alter the states by intelligently manipulating specific measurements while keeping the
residue norm unchanged in order not to raise the BDD alarm as follows:
‖za − h(x̂comp)‖ = ‖z + a− h(x̂+ c)‖
= ‖z − h(x̂)‖ ≤ τ (3.4)
Based on (3.4), the attacker must consider the output value of the measurement function
h(x) to successfully launch a stealthy attack. The vector c corresponds to the alteration
in the state variables from the attack vector α on the measurements. The attacker is
constrained by the following conditions in order to successfully launch a hidden attack:
1. The attack vector c has non-zero entries only for load buses,
2. The attacks are launched on buses which are not constant current loads, as it can be
easily verified if the current values are altered
3. Injection of non-load buses cannot be altered . To achieve a load distribution attack
(i.e., where the net change in the system remains zero), the attacker will consider the









Vn(Gjn sin(θjn)−Bjn cos(θji) (3.6)
where Gjn +Bjn is the (j, n) entry of the complex bus admittance matrix and θjn =
θj − θn is the angle difference between bus j and n. The attacker must constrain
the attack vectors to these conditions in order to keep the attack undetected by the
BDD and not violate the electrical physical laws of the system.
3.2 Optimal Attacks Strategy
In order to maximize the losses on the system, the adversary, equipped with FDI stealthy
formulation, is able to incorporate the attack vectors formulated in the previous section into
the DSOPF. The optimal attack formulation is derived through an optimization problem
that mimics the features of the original DSOPF that the system operator utilizes. The
attack strategy flowchart is shown in Figure 3.1, detailing the work done by the attacker
to construct the attack vectors, to be injected in the measurements received by the DSSE
process. The first (left) part of the flowchart is shows the steps done by the attacker, while
the second (right) part is the normal DSOPF operations run by the PDS operator. For
the attacker, the first step is getting access to the measurements sent from different meters
and sensors devices such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) or PMUs [138, 139]. Second,
the adversary gets an estimate of the network by deploying an DSSE to get accurate
state estimates. The third step consists of running a modified DSOPF problem, which has
similar constraints to the operator’s DSOPF, but with a modified objective function, which
maximizes the losses of the PDS operator. The derivation of this problem is explained in
the next section. After running the optimization problem, the solution point represents the
maximum losses of the system given the system parameters and constraints. The arguments
of the optimal solution represent the values of the variables that lead to this solution.
The gap between the resulting arguments and the arguments from the uncompromised
DSOPF represent the values of injection to be added to the measurements, according to
the process presented in section 3.1. These vectors can be injected into the measurements
data received from the meters without triggering the BDD alarm. Since the vectors are
synthesized from the modified DSOPF, they represent the optimal attack vectors to be
added to the measurements. The now corrupted measurements are passed to the PDS


































Figure 3.1: Optimal attacks on DSOPF Flow Chart
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3.3 Attack Vectors Construction
The core attacks strategy is based on the running a modified DSOPF that resembles the
PDS operator optimization problem, but outputs the highest losses for the given opti-
mization problem. In order to achieve this objective, the attacker incorporates the FDI
attacks construction strategy as part of the optimization problem constraints. Based on
the SDP optimization methodology. The adversary ultimate objective is to manipulate
the measurement vector z to change the ith entry in attack vector c by using (3.3), with
ci = 0 if the i
th state is not changed. The attacker runs the DSOPF with the objective of





subject to (2.30b),(2.30c),(2.30d),(2.30e) (2.30f), (3.7b)
‖diag(za − h(x̂bad))‖≤ τ , (3.7c)
saij ≤ saij ≤ s̄aij (3.7d)
where saij , s̄aij are the lower and upper bounds of power injections after alterations of
measurements using (3.3) of pre-specified limits by the attacker, inspired by the AC attacks
formulation [18]. Constraint (3.7c) is added to ensure that the altered measurements
bypass the BDD according to (3.4). Note that this DSOPF, run by the attacker, is similar
to the original problem with a different objective function, and is used to determine the
deviation in current variables Iij to be injected for maximum losses in the DSOPF. The
affected currents represent the sub-graph of measurements needed to be changed to hide
the attack. The choice of the BCSE allows to add the linear measurement function as a
convex constraint implicit in constraint (3.7c) as part of the DSOPF problem.
3.4 Attacks Analysis
The case study is based on the IEEE-34 radial bus system. The system loads are modeled
based on the exponential load model, and the substation voltage is set at 1.05 p.u. It is
assumed that measurements taken in the system are active and reactive power flows on
all branches. Lower and upper bounds of voltage are defined at 0.9 and 1.1 p.u. Shunt
capacitors, C1 and C2 are placed at nodes 844 and 848, respectively, as the original system
configuration in [61]. No pseudo measurements are considered during the analysis and
attacks construction. The SDP convex optimization problem of the DSOPF problem is
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implemented using the CVX toolbox [140]. First, the attack vectors are constructed as
per the previous section, and added to the measurements of each phase. Figure 3.2 and
Figure 3.3 depict the DSSE normalized residuals without and with attacks for the branch
currents magnitudes and phases vectors of the three phases. 300 scenarios are generated
to validate that the norm does not trigger the BDD alarm. Second, the voltage profile





































Figure 3.2: Norm of normalized residual error of Branch current magnitudes vectors of
each phase
is analyzed after the attack vectors are injected to the measurements. Figure 3.4 shows
the voltage profile of the three phases for the system nodes resulting from the original
and compromised DSOPF. The voltage nodes remained within permissible range, however
the losses increase from 187.07 KW obtained form the original DSOPF to 218.43 KW,
an increase of approximately 17% in power losses. The voltage deviations are a direct
result from the FDI attacks, but no there is no formal mechanism of detecting such attacks
from observing the voltage profile. In addition, reactive power injection from the shunt
capacitors C1 and C2 increased from 140 KVAR and 150 KVAR to 180 KVAR and 160
KVAR respectively. Thus, it is shown that the stealthy attacks kept the voltage profile
within the regulation limits, and no physical damage is observed. However, the effects
of the attacks is evident in the increase of both the power losses and the reactive power
injection of the shunt capacitors.
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Figure 3.3: Norm of normalized residual error of Branch current phases vectors of each
phase
3.4.1 Effects of load types
As PDS loads cannot be always treated as constant power, it is necessary to consider the
load type in determining the currents. Figure 3.5 depicts the difference in node voltages due
to the same attack for the same conditions for phase A. The loads are modeled based on the
exponential load model described in section 2.3. Configuration O is the standard IEEE-34
load configuration [61], which is a mixture of constant impedance, constant current and
constant power loads, configuration P is all constant power loads, and configuration Z is all
constant impedance loads. It it seen that the constant impedance loads present the highest
sensitivity of voltage variations due to the power measurements alterations. This analysis
demonstrates that the attack effects are highly dependant on the system configuration and
load types. Thus, voltage deviation from measurements manipulation depends on the load
type of the attacked node.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented a detailed analysis of the FDI attacks on the IEEE-34 3-phases
unbalanced radial distribution system. The stealthy FDI attacks are based on the BCSE,
























































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Voltage profile of phases A, B, and C of the IEEE-34 Bus system based on the
original and compromised DSOPF
individually. A maximum attack strategy is derived to target the DSOPF, which is modeled
using the SDP model to accurately represent the OPF problem of radial systems. The
attacks strategy is based on an optimization problem that mimics the DSOPF, however
with a modified objective function and added constraints to guarantee the stealthiness
of the attacks. The attacks compromised the optimal solution of the power losses, by
manipulating optimization problem control variables, while keeping the voltage profile
within limits. Different load models were considered in the case study to analyze the effect













































































Figure 3.5: Change in voltage nodes (absolute values) due to compromised DSOPF for
different system loads configurations.
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Chapter 4
Attacks detection using Recurrent
Neural Networks
This chapter discusses the usage of machine learning techniques for stealthy attacks detec-
tion in the framework of PDS. The objective is to develop a ML model capable of detecting
anomalies in the measurements data vectors and flag them as possible FDI attacks. The
RNN model is first derived to fit the described problems. Then, the model is trained on
real power flow measurements and statistically evaluated on unseen testing data. The work
in this chapter has been published in [141].
4.1 Recurrent Neural Networks
Unlike regular Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) which assume inputs (outputs) are in-
dependent from each other, RNN are a special type of neural networks, that make use of
sequential information to predict the output [142]. Sequential data might contain temporal
correlation between inputs at time t and inputs at time t− 1, t− 2, · · · . By using informa-
tion of previously calculated outputs, RNN is capable of constructing a memory, which is
to be used in computing the output. RNN can be utilized as a sequence classifier. For an
observation sequence ∈ Rl, {x1,x2, ...,xl} and corresponding labels ∈ Rl, {y1, y2, ..., yl}, the
objective is develop a learning function that maps (labels) the feature to its corresponding
label, i.e., f : x→ y. RNN models dynamic systems, by sending feedback signals, so that
subsequent outputs depend on computed output. This can be mathematically modeled as
[1]:
ht = f(ht−1,xt) (4.1)
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where ht is the hidden state, ht−1 is the previous hidden state, and xt is the current feature
observed, and f is a nonlinear mapping function. Equation (4.1) captures the essence of
RNN and what differentiates it from regular neural networks. The hidden state ht is used
as a memory to capture sequence information. Figure 4.1 shows the unfolding of RNN
in time of the computation. xt denotes the input at time t, while the hidden state ht
represents the memory of the network, and it depends on the previous hidden state and
current input. The output of the network at time t is zt. The memory concept of the RNN
gives it great advantages in storing information about the time sequence.
Figure 4.1: Left: Recursive Description of RNN. Right: Corresponding Extended RNN
model for time sequence [1]
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4.2 Backpropagation Through Time (BPTT)
Conventional Neural Networks use the Backpropagation Learning Algorithm (BPL) to train
the network by adjusting the weights of the network. The BPL is based on the gradient
descent technique, used to minimize the network cumulative error. The Backpropagation
Through Time (BPTT) Algorithm is an extension of the BPL over a time sequence where
the gradient at each output depends on calculations of current as well as previous steps.
BPTT has been developed by many authors independently as in [143] and [144]. Derivation
of the BPTT is summarized as follows [1]: Starting with the RNN model described in Figure
4.1, parameters are assumed to be the same across the whole sequence in each time step.
This assumption is used to simplify the gradient calculations. At time t we have,
ht = tanh(Whhht−1 +Wxhxt + bh) (4.2)
zt = softmax(Whzht + bz) (4.3)
where bh and bz are the bias terms for the hidden state and prediction at time step t.
The maximum likelihood is used to estimate the model parameters. The minimization of
objective function of negative log likelihood is
L(x, y) = −
∑
t
yt log zt (4.4)
where zt is the prediction at time step t. The notation L will be used as objective function
for simplicity. The notation L(t) indicates the output at time t while L(t + 1) indicates






















= −(yt − zt) (4.6)
The weight Whz between the hidden state h and output z is the same across all time



































The above equation only considers the time step t → t + 1. As the RNN model uses
previous state for subsequent state calculation, the hidden state ht+1 depends partially on














Aggregating gradients with respect to Whh over the whole sequence and using the BPTT

















The same process applied in Equation (4.7)-(4.11) is also applied on the weights Wxh, by

















It is worth mentioning that the same advantage feature of RNN, of having an internal
memory, represents a major challenge in some applications such as text prediction, namely
the problem of vanishing or exploding gradients. This however is not a problem in the
application of anomaly detection, as a large memory is not required. When propagating
over a long sequence, that gradient value will vanish after a few time steps, as it shrinks
layer after layer. Thus, the far away states do not contribute significantly to the gradient
computing. On the other side of the problem spectrum, gradient explosion results from
large value in matrix multiplication of while computing the gradient over the sequence.
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4.3 RNN Parameters Tuning
Based on the RNN theory, an algorithm is developed to detect the FDI attacks. After
generating the flow measurements, adding the attack vectors, and taking a subset of the
data, the first step is to find the optimal parameters for the RNN. There are three main
parameters which add recurrent time delayed connections to the RNN [145]:
1. Input delays dIn ∈ [0, 1, 2, ...]: This allows the output to not only depend on current
input, but also on previous inputs. For regular neural networks, dIn = [0]. The
benefit of the Input delay is to use the temporal correlation between successive inputs
to predict the next output.
2. Internal delays dInternal ∈ [0, 1, 2, ...]: This allows the current internal states to de-
pend on previous dInternal internal states, and specifies how many previous internal
states to be used. For regular neural networks, dInternal = [0].
3. Output delays dOut ∈ [0, 1, 2, ...]: This determines how many previous output states
are used to predict current output. For regular neural networks, dOut = [0]. This
parameter controls the recurrent behavior of using current output for subsequent out-
puts. Previous outputs are particularly important in applications where the predicted
output heavily depends on previous outputs.
The optimal set of parameters that achieves least error has been determined by training the
network several times using the BPTT algorithm. After finding the optimal parameters,
the network is used to predict the attacks in the test data. As the output of the network
is not constrained to a binary output, a threshold is used to determine the classification
of output either 1 (indicating the presence of attack vector), and 0 (indicating normal
measurement vector).
4.4 RNN Model Evaluation
After building the RNN model as per the previous section, it is trained and tested on actual
measurements to detect FDI attacks injected into the data stream. First, the AC power
flow model is used to generate the power flow measurements for the IEEE-34 distribution
bus system. The actual load data is obtained over a period of five years from the Ontario
Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) [2]. The data is available with an hourly
resolution and depicted in Figure 4.2, and is shown as 43800 data points. To better
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model a practical the attacks scenarios, the resolution of the data is increased to 5-minutes
resolution by interpolating the hourly data points. The attack vectors are constructed



















Figure 4.2: Five years power loads [2]
according to the procedure prescribed in section 3, which ensures that it will bypass the
traditional BDD within the DSSE process. A total number of 100 attack instances were
randomly injected in the measurements. Each attack instance was contained a random
number between 6-12 of attack vectors. It is assumed that the attacker will not launch
less than 6 attack vectors to induce a noticeable effect in the measurement. Each attack
vector added to the flow measurements was per Equation (3.1). The measurements error
is modeled as a Gaussian noise vector with a sound to noise ratio (SNR) equal to 12.
The IESO data is divided into training data and testing data, representing roughly 60%
(three years of data) and 40% (two years of data), respectively. Attacks are added to the
measurements in the form of instances. For each attack instance, random attack vectors
between six and twelve vectors are added. It was assumed that the adversary would not
corrupt less than six attack vectors to achieve any practical damage through the launched
attack. Attack instances are randomly distributed along all the training data as well as
the testing data. All simulations were implemented in MATLAB environment. The RNN
is trained for 100 iterations and, with one iteration means passing over all input data
points. Figure 4.3 shows the decrease of the log of the error function, based on Equation
(4.4) over the 100 iterations. This indicates the improvement of the classifier to correctly
predict the state of the input whether a normal or compromised measurement value. For
the data set and system under consideration, after adjusting the RNN parameters, it has
been found that the optimal number of delay input is dIn = 1, dInternal = 1, and
dOut = 5. This is due to the characteristics of data presented to the network. In the case
of power flow measurements, where the load does not witness a sudden decrease or increase,
46
there should be a correlation between the current output and previous inputs (power flow
measurements). For the data set in use, increasing dOut > 5 causes gradients explosion and
does not yield better results. The stream of measurements over five years with increased



















Figure 4.3: Log of the RNN error function
resolution has 262800 data points, with 60%(315360) data points for training and cross-
validation, and 40%(210240) data points for testing. The measurements points were labeled
either 0 or 1: state 0 meant no attack, and state 1 meant attack. Accordingly, the RNN
model worked as a binary classifier that predicted the state of the measurements: either 0 or
1. Figure 4.4 shows the RNN predictions over the testing data points, with the zoomed-in
portion showing individual data points detected as compromised. The zoomed-in portion
affirms the value of historical data to identify attack vectors. Measurement points 80568
through 80579 were compromised with the FDI attack vectors, and therefore have the
attack state of 1. However, measurement points 80568 and 80569 were not detected, and
the predicted state of the RNN is 0. After only two attack points, the RNN was able
to correctly flag the subsequent ten points as attacks, and predicted a state 1 for the
measurements. In order to formally measure the effectiveness of the classification model,
statistical analysis is performed on the output predictions. A commonly used evaluation
approach is based on the confusion matrix. It is based on the count of correct prediction of
each class in the tackled problem. The confusion matrix shown in Table 4.1 breaks down
the four different categories (possibilities) of a predicted value for a given actual value The
actual values represent the correct label (ground truth), while predicted values represent
the output label (prediction) of the classifier. The four categories are defined as follows:
• True Positive: Actual value is positive and prediction is positive
• False Positive: Actual value is negative and prediction is positive
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Figure 4.4: RNN Predictions for FDI attacks on IEEE-34 bus
Table 4.1: Confusion matrix
Actual Values
Positive (1) Negative (0)
Predicted Values
Positive (1) True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
Negative (0) False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
• False negative: Actual value is positive and prediction is negative
• True negative: Actual value is negative and prediction is negative
Based on counts of each categories, specific evaluation is performed by the following metrics:
• Accuracy is considered the basic performance measure, as it measures the prediction
of positive and negative instances. In this case, the accuracy represents the ability
to differentiate between the attack state (positive) and non-attack state (negative).
Mathematically, accuracy is represented by
Accuracy =
TN + TP
TN + TP + FN + FP
(4.13)
• Sensitivity measures the ratio of correctly positive predictions to the sum of True
Positive and False Negative. Sensitivity is also called True Positive Rate (TPR) or
Recall. In this case, the sensitivity measures the proportion of correctly predicted







• Specificity measures the ratio of correctly negative predictions to the sum of True
Negative and False Positive. The False Positive Rate (FPR) is measured as (1 -
Specificity). In this case, specificity measures the proportion of correctly predicted
non-attack states (negative) to all (actual) non-attack states. Mathematically, speci-





• Precision measures the ratio of True Positive to the sum of all positive instances.
In this case, precision indicates the ration of correct predictions of attack states






The RNN has been able to detect every attack instance, where an attack instance consisted
of a random number of consecutive attack vectors. In addition, the RNN has very good
indications of all statistical performances for attack vectors as shown in Table 4.2. All
100 attack instances have been detected correctly, and no attack instance has been flagged
outside an attack instance, and, overall, only 20 attack vectors were not detected by the
model. These FP vectors were usually an additional point (or two) at the attack end, that
were classified as attack vectors. The 167 FN vectors represent the lagging of the RNN
to flag an attack. The mean delay is 1.67 vector, and ranged between zero (no delay) and
two attack vectors (maximum delay). The results therefore indicate that this model will
be effective in the case that the attack instance is compromised of more than two attack
vectors. In the attack detection model, the accuracy and sensitivity are the most important
indices. The high accuracy is the first good indicator of the RNN model. The sensitivity is
not as high as the other metric, due to the 167 missed attack vector. However, since these
vectors represented a delay in response, and all other vectors in the same attack instance
were detected, it is not a major performance issue.
Another statistical important indicator is the the Receiver ROC curve, depicted in
Figure 4.5. The ROC illustrates the diagnostic ability of the binary classifier and is a plot
of the (TPR) against the (FPR), and is compared to the curve of a random classifier (50%
accuracy). The random classifier has an area of 0.5, while the RNN classifier has an area
of 0.99, which approaches the prefect classifier area of 1.
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Table 4.2: Performance Table for RNN FDI attacks detection model on the IEEE 34-Bus
power flow measurements
Criteria Score
# Attack Instances 100
# Detected Instances 100
# Attack Vectors 1015
# Detected Vectors 868
True Positive (TP) 848
False Positive (FP) 20
True Negative (TN) 209493























ROC curve (area = 0.99)
Figure 4.5: ROC curve
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposed the usage of the RNN to detect the stealthy attacks that otherwise
bypass the conventional BDD techniques. The RNN model constructed a memory by con-
sidering multiple time steps when fitting the weights of the minimization algorithm. By
analyzing the temporal correlation of inputs and outputs, the RNN was able to detect the
attacks in the measurements data in a fast and accurate manner. The model was tested
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using real-world data over the span of five years, and the performance of the model was
evaluated using the confusion matrix statistical indices. With overall very good perfor-
mance, the RNN was able to detect all attack instances and with a maximum delay of two





The FDI attacks on distribution level systems have been investigated. The studies were
based on a detailed, 3-phases unbalanced radial system, which included VVC devices. The
objective of the research was twofold: Investigating the optimal stealthy attack strategy
from the attacker perspective, and proposing a detection model to identify these attacks
using a machine learning technique. First, a detailed model was developed to analyze
impact of the stealthy attacks on the DSSE and DSOPF. By utilizing the BCSE for the
DSSE, the model analyzed the effects of attacks on each phase separately. The attacks were
formulated based on a optimization problem that is similar in structure to the DSOPF,
however aims to oppose the objective function of the system operator. Given the nature of
the considered radial distribution system, the DSOPF was based on the SDP relaxation.
The effects of attacks were investigated on the voltage profile and the injection of VVC
devices. Also, the sensitivity of loads types to the power manipulation were investigated.
Second, a ML approach was proposed to tackle the problem of detecting stealthy attacks,
which are not detected through conventional BDD methods. The main concept was to
analyze multiple measurement points to flag any anomalies in the measurements. Using
five years of real-world data, the load profile was used to train a RNN model to detect the
stealthy attacks. The method depended on the temporal correlation of the data to identity
the FDI attacks vectors.
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5.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis can be highlighted as follows:
1. Optimal FDI attacks strategy on DSOPF: An optimal FDI attack strategy that
targets the DSOPF was derived, based on a 3-phases unbalanced PDS. The attacker
aims to maximize the losses of the objective function of the operator’s DSOPF, by
incorporating the attacks in the constraints of an optimization problem that mimics
the behaviour of the operators’ DSOPF.
2. Attacks Detection using RNN: The RNN was applied as a machine learning
technique to analyze the stream of power flow measurements and detect any anomaly
in the data. The mechanism facilitated identifying attacks on three-phase unbalanced
distribution systems in a fast and reliable method.
5.3 Future Work
Future research on the cyber-physical security of PDS can include the following:
1. Inclusion and exact modelling of Volt/Var Control devices
2. Integrating DERs in the modelled system and DSOPF problem
3. Investigating effects of FDI on distributed DSSE techniques
4. Considering different attacks models on the PDS
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Figure A.1: IEEE-34 Distribution System
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Table A.1: Distributed loads
Node Node Load Ph-A Ph-A Ph-B Ph-B Ph-C Ph-C
A B Model kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr
802 806 Y-PQ 0 0 30 15 25 14
808 810 Y-I 0 0 16 8 0 0
818 820 Y-Z 34 17 0 0 0 0
820 822 Y-PQ 135 70 0 0 0 0
816 824 D-I 0 0 5 2 0 0
824 826 Y-I 0 0 40 20 0 0
824 828 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 4 2
828 830 Y-PQ 7 3 0 0 0 0
854 856 Y-PQ 0 0 4 2 0 0
832 858 D-Z 7 3 2 1 6 3
858 864 Y-PQ 2 1 0 0 0 0
858 834 D-PQ 4 2 15 8 13 7
834 860 D-Z 16 8 20 10 110 55
860 836 D-PQ 30 15 10 6 42 22
836 840 D-I 18 9 22 11 0 0
862 838 Y-PQ 0 0 28 14 0 0
842 844 Y-PQ 9 5 0 0 0 0
844 846 Y-PQ 0 0 25 12 20 11
846 848 Y-PQ 0 0 23 11 0 0
Table A.2: Spot Loads
Node Load Ph-A Ph-A Ph-B PhB2 Ph-C Ph-C
Model kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr
860 Y-PQ 20 16 20 16 20 16
840 Y-I 9 7 9 7 9 7
844 Y-Z 135 105 135 105 135 105
848 D-PQ 20 16 20 16 20 16
890 D-I 150 75 150 75 150 75
830 D-Z 10 5 10 5 25 10
70
Table A.3: Line data
Node A Node B Length(ft.) Config.
800 802 2580 300
802 806 1730 300
806 808 32230 300
808 810 5804 303
808 812 37500 300
812 814 29730 300
814 850 10 301
816 818 1710 302
816 824 10210 301
818 820 48150 302
820 822 13740 302
824 826 3030 303
824 828 840 301
828 830 20440 301
830 854 520 301
832 858 4900 301
832 888 0 XFM-1
834 860 2020 301
834 842 280 301
836 840 860 301
836 862 280 301
842 844 1350 301
844 846 3640 301
846 848 530 301
850 816 310 301
852 832 10 301
854 856 23330 303
854 852 36830 301
858 864 1620 302
858 834 5830 301
860 836 2680 301
862 838 4860 304
888 890 10560 300
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Table A.4: Impedance configurations
Impedance Raa Xaa Rab Xab Rac Xac Rbb Xbb Rbc Xbc Rcc Xcc
Configuration Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile Ω per mile
300 1.3368 1.3343 0.2101 0.5779 0.213 0.5015 1.3238 1.3569 0.2066 0.4591 1.3294 1.3471
301 1.93 1.4115 0.2327 0.6442 0.2359 0.5691 1.9157 1.4281 0.2288 0.5238 1.9219 1.4209
302 2.7995 1.4855 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
303 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.7995 1.4855 0 0 0 0
Table A.5: Shunt Capacitors
Node Ph-A Ph-B Ph-C
# kVAr kVAr kVAr
844 200 200 200
848 250 250 250
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